Competition in the German Broadband Access Market

This paper gives a survey of the current state of competition in the German Broadband access market. Existing regulations and their impact on the deployment of high-speed Internet access are evaluated. It is argued that facilities-based competition is preferable to open-network regulations. The most prospective candidate as an independent network capable of generating facilities-based competition in Germany is the cable-broadcasting network. The current developments in the cable industry and the expectations for its success in the short to medium term lead to the conclusion that in the short run at least, there is a need for unbundling regulation to foster competition. Improvements to the current open-network regulation-practices in Germany are suggested. --broadband access,local network competition,regulation

Competition in the German Broadband Access Market

This paper gives a survey of the current state of competition in the German Broadband access market. Existing regulations and their impact on the deployment of high-speed Internet access are evaluated. It is argued that facilities-based competition is preferable to open-network regulations. The most prospective candidate as an independent network capable of generating facilities-based competition in Germany is the cable-broadcasting network. The current developments in the cable industry and the expectations for its success in the short to medium term lead to the conclusion that in the short run at least, there is a need for unbundling regulation to foster competition. Improvements to the current opennetwork regulation-practices in Germany are suggested

Implications of Network Convergence on Local Access Regulation in the U.S. and the EU

This paper provides an overview of telecommunications regulation in the U.S. and in Europe. For each region the history of telecommunications regulations as well as the current regulatory regime is portrayed. The focus of this overview is on the question of how unbundling regulations in the local access market have evolved in parallel to the convergence of telecommunications with Internet and broadcasting services. The criteria used by the regulatory authorities to identify those network elements which incumbents are required to offer to competitors at regulated rates are compared to the criteria provided by the “essential facilities doctrine”, a concept used in antitrust law. The analysis concludes that U.S. deregulation has gone too far with respect to some broadband access markets while in Europe, a severe tendency to overregulation is observed

Die ZEW/Creditreform Konjunkturumfrage bei Dienstleistern der Informationsgesellschaft : Dokumentation der Umfrage und Einführung des ZEW-Indikators der Dienstleister der Informationsgesellschaft

Die vorliegende Arbeit beschreibt die Konzeption und Erhebung der ZEW/Creditreform Umfrage bei Dienstleistern der Informationsgesellschaft. Diese im Jahr 2002 eingeführte Umfrage geht aus einer Umfrage bei unternehmensnahen Dienstleistern hervor, die ZEW/Creditreform zwischen 1994 und 2001 vierteljährlich durchgeführt haben. Die Dokumentation beschreibt die Abgrenzung des befragten Wirtschaftssektors Dienstleister der Informationsgesellschaft und seine Bedeutung in Relation zur Gesamtwirtschaft. Das Stichprobendesign und die Inhalte der Umfrage werden vorgestellt. Des Weiteren wird ein neu entwickelter Stimmungsindikator für den Wirtschaftszweig Dienstleister der Informationsgesellschaft eingeführt. Die Entwicklung und die Berechnung dieses ZEW-Indikators der Dienstleister der Informationsgesellschaft (ZEW-IDI) werden erläutert. Der ZEW-IDI ist der erste, uns bekannte, Stimmungsindikator für einen Teil des Deutschen Dienstleistungssektors

Implications of Network Convergence on Local Access Regulation in the U.S. and the EU

This paper provides an overview of telecommunications regulation in the U.S. and in Europe. For each region the history of telecommunications regulations as well as the current regulatory regime is portrayed. The focus of this overview is on the question of how unbundling regulations in the local access market have evolved in parallel to the convergence of telecommunications with Internet and broadcasting services. The criteria used by the regulatory authorities to identify those network elements which incumbents are required to offer to competitors at regulated rates are compared to the criteria provided by the ?essential facilities doctrine?, a concept used in antitrust law. The analysis concludes that U.S. deregulation has gone too far with respect to some broadband access markets while in Europe, a severe tendency to overregulation is observed. --network convergence,unbundling regulation

Die ZEW/Creditreform Konjunkturumfrage bei Dienstleistern der Informationsgesellschaft: Dokumentation der Umfrage und Einführung des ZEW-Indikators der Dienstleister der Informationsgesellschaft

Die vorliegende Arbeit beschreibt die Konzeption und Erhebung der ZEW/Creditreform Umfrage bei Dienstleistern der Informationsgesellschaft. Diese im Jahr 2002 eingeführte Umfrage geht aus einer Umfrage bei unternehmensnahen Dienstleistern hervor, die ZEW/Creditreform zwischen 1994 und 2001 vierteljährlich durchgeführt haben. Die Dokumentation beschreibt die Abgrenzung des befragten Wirtschaftssektors Dienstleister der Informationsgesellschaft und seine Bedeutung in Relation zur Gesamtwirtschaft. Das Stichprobendesign und die Inhalte der Umfrage werden vorgestellt. Des Weiteren wird ein neu entwickelter Stimmungsindikator für den Wirtschaftszweig Dienstleister der Informationsgesellschaft eingeführt. Die Entwicklung und die Berechnung dieses ZEW-Indikators der Dienstleister der Informationsgesellschaft (ZEW-IDI) werden erläutert. Der ZEW-IDI ist der erste, uns bekannte, Stimmungsindikator für einen Teil des Deutschen Dienstleistungssektors. --

Regulatory practice in the European telecommunications sector: Normative justification and practical application

The telecommunications sector is characterized by economies of scale and scope, high sunk costs, and strong network effects. This combination may facilitate monopolization and abuse of market power. The present study evaluates the need for sector-specific regulation in this sector. It is shown that there is a conflict between static and dynamic efficiency goals. A comparison of two prominent regulatory approaches for the telecommunications sector shows that the disaggregated approach takes account of this conflict most adequately, as it is committed to minimal regulation. The European regulatory framework for electronic communications markets is based on economic theory, and could principally be used to limit regulation to network areas in which stable networkspecific market power is localized. However, especially the criteria for the assessment of significant market power (SMP) are applied too liberally, such that, in practice, overregulation has resulted. --

Network Externalities and Interconnection Incentives

The majority of industrial organizations literature on network externalities looks at firm behavior under given market characteristics. The present paper instead asks the question whether the presence of network externalities can change market characteristics, specifically, whether an initially large market player can decline cooperation (interconnection) with competing network operators and thereby gain a dominant position when network externalities are significant. The paper comes to the conclusion that only when a network operator already has network specific market power due to the ownership of a monopolistic bottleneck network area, will network externalities enable the operator to increase his market dominance. In competitive markets or in contestable natural monopolies, however, network externalities will not lend network specific market power to an initially large operator. In these markets, the market process can be expected to solve the trade-off between ensuring cooperation between competing operators and at the same time safeguarding competition in product characteristics and quality of service. --network externalities,interconnection,regulation

Network Externalities and Interconnection Incentives

The majority of industrial organizations literature on network externalities looks at firm behavior under given market characteristics. The present paper instead asks the question whether the presence of network externalities can change market characteristics, specifically, whether an initially large market player can decline cooperation (interconnection) with competing network operators and thereby gain a dominant position when network externalities are significant. The paper comes to the conclusion that only when a network operator already has network specific market power due to the ownership of a monopolistic bottleneck network area, will network externalities enable the operator to increase his market dominance. In competitive markets or in contestable natural monopolies, however, network externalities will not lend network specific market power to an initially large operator. In these markets, the market process can be expected to solve the trade-off between ensuring cooperation between competing operators and at the same time safeguarding competition in product characteristics and quality of service

Regulatory practice in the European telecommunications sector : Normative justification and practical application

The telecommunications sector is characterized by economies of scale and scope, high sunk costs, and strong network effects. This combination may facilitate monopolization and abuse of market power. The present study evaluates the need for sector-specific regulation in this sector. It is shown that there is a conflict between static and dynamic efficiency goals. A comparison of two prominent regulatory approaches for the telecommunications sector shows that the disaggregated approach takes account of this conflict most adequately, as it is committed to minimal regulation. The European regulatory framework for electronic communications markets is based on economic theory, and could principally be used to limit regulation to network areas in which stable networkspecific market power is localized. However, especially the criteria for the assessment of significant market power (SMP) are applied too liberally, such that, in practice, overregulation has resulted